The quick fox jumped over the lazy dog

In this chapter I argue that we should extend moral consideration to a much wider range of beings than we currently do. There are at least two reasons why. The first reason is epistemic: We should be open to the possibility that a very wide range of beings have moral status, and we should extend at least some moral consideration to these beings accordingly. The second reason is practical: We now have the power to impact a very wide range of beings, both within and across species, nations, and generations. The upshot is that we should extend at least some moral consideration to quintillions of beings – including invertebrates, plants, and some artificial intelligences – with revisionary implications for many moral theories.

According to what we call the Emotional Alignment Design Policy, artificial entities should be designed to elicit emotional reactions that reflect the entities’ capacities and moral status, or lack thereof. This principle can be violated in two ways: by designing an artificial system that elicits stronger or weaker emotional reactions than its capacities and moral status warrant (overshooting or undershooting), or by designing a system that elicits the wrong type of emotional reaction (hitting the wrong target). Although presumably attractive, practical implementation faces several challenges including: How can we respect user autonomy while promoting appropriate responses? How should we navigate expert and public disagreement and uncertainty about facts and values? To what extent should designs conform to versus attempt to alter user assumptions and attitudes?

Experts have often assumed animals lack consciousness until proven otherwise, but some now suggest changing this presumption. Options include assuming consciousness in all animals, all living beings, all with neurons, all with complex cognition, or even all beings. I assess these options scientifically and ethically, arguing that different defaults make sense in different contexts. For example, a broad assumption of consciousness may be better for ethical theory and scientific practice, since it supports precaution and innovation. However, a narrower assumption may be better for scientific theory and ethical practice, since it works with existing evidence and institutions. By adopting multiple context-specific defaults, we can better serve both science and ethics.

This paper argues for ethical oversight in insect research. Despite the widespread use of insects in scientific and medical research, they receive little to no protection under existing animal welfare regulations. We show that many insects exhibit cognitive and behavioral markers of sentience and argue that, when there is uncertainty about whether an animal is sentient, we have a responsibility to consider welfare risks for that animal. We then explore how ethical oversight for insect research could be implemented by adapting existing frameworks for vertebrate research while accounting for the unique challenges posed by insects as research subjects. While extending oversight to insects would require overcoming numerous barriers, failing to do so risks both moral negligence and public mistrust.

Despite growing recognition of the importance of One Health, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development omits explicit reference to animal health and welfare. This report, produced by Stockholm Environment Institute and the NYU Center for Environmental and Animal Protection, argues that this omission undermines policy coherence and overlooks critical interconnections between human, animal, and environmental health. Drawing on expert analysis across all 17 SDGs, we identify three complementary pathways for integration: strengthening animal welfare consideration in current SDG implementation, introducing new targets and indicators aligned with existing Goals, and establishing a dedicated Goal on animal health and welfare. As governments prepare for post-2030 deliberations, systematic integration of animal health and welfare offers opportunities to address root causes of health, environmental, and development challenges.

This paper makes a case for insect and AI legal personhood. Humans share the world not only with large animals like chimpanzees and elephants but also with small animals like ants and bees. In the future, we might also share the world with sentient or otherwise morally significant AI systems. These realities raise questions about what kind of legal status insects, AI systems, and other nonhumans should have in the future. At present, debates about legal personhood mostly exclude these kinds of individuals. However, I argue that our current framework for assessing legal personhood, coupled with our current framework for assessing risk and uncertainty, imply that we should treat these kinds of individuals as legal persons. I also argue that we have good reason to accept this conclusion rather than alter these frameworks.